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Abstract
The present paper develops a unified correspondence treatment of the Sahlqvist theory for
possibility semantics, extending the results in [45] from Sahlqvist formulas to the strictly larger
class of inductive formulas, and from the full possibility frames to filter-descriptive possibility
frames. Specifically, we define the possibility semantics version of the algorithm ALBA, and an
adapted interpretation of the expanded modal language used in the algorithm. We prove the
soundness of the algorithm with respect to both (the dual algebras of) full possibility frames and
(the dual algebras of) filter-descriptive possibility frames. We make some comparisons among
different semantic settings in the design of the algorithms, and fit possibility semantics into this
broader picture.
One notable feature of the adaptation of ALBA to possibility frames setting is that the so-called
nominal variables, which are interpreted as complete join-irreducibles in the standard setting, are
interpreted as regular open closures of “singletons” in the present setting.
1 Introduction
Possibility semantics. Possibility semantics was proposed by Humberstone [30] as an alternative
semantics for modal logic, which is based on possibilities rather than possible worlds in Kripke se-
mantics, where every possibility does not provide truth values of all propositions, but only some of
them. Different possibilities are ordered by a refinement relation where some possibilities provide more
information about the truth value of propositions than others.
In recent years, possibility semantics has been intensely investigated: [28] gives a construction
of canonical possibility models with a finitary flavor, [1] studies the intuitionistic generalization of
possibility models, [26] investigates the first-order counterpart of possibility semantics, [27] focuses on
the relation between Kripke models and possibility models, [44] provides a bimodal perspective on
possibility semantics. A comprehensive study of possibility semantics can be found in [29]. In [45],
the first author of the present paper investigates the correspondence theory for possibility semantics
and proves a correspondence theorem for Sahlqvist formulas over full possibility frames—which are the
counterparts of (full) Kripke frames in the possibility semantics setting—using insights from algebraic
correspondence theory developed in [13]. In [29, Theorem 7.20], Holliday shows that all inductive
formulas are filter-canonical (i.e. their validity is preserved from the canonical possibility models to
their underlying canonical full possibility frames), hence every normal modal logic axiomatized by
inductive formulas is sound and complete with respect to its canonical full possibility frame. Inductive
formulas [24] form a syntactically defined class of formulas which properly extends Sahlqvist formulas,
while enjoying their same property of canonicity and correspondence [9]. Holliday’s result provides the
canonicity half of the Sahlqvist-type result for inductive formulas relative to possibility semantics. The
present paper provides the remaining half. Namely, we show that inductive formulas have first-order
correspondents in full possibility frames as well as in filter-descriptive possibility frames1.
1As remarked in [29, page 103], correspondence results might be lost when moving from full possibility frames to
filter-descriptive possibility frames.
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Unified correspondence. The methodology of the present paper pertains to a wider theory, referred
to as unified correspondence. As explained in [13, 8], this theory is built on the duality between the
algebraic and the relational semantics of non-classical logics, thanks to which it has explained the
“Sahlqvist phenomenon” in terms of the algebraic and order-theoretic properties of the interpretations
of the logical connectives. The focus on these properties has been key to being able to generalize
the Sahlqvist-type results from modal logic to a wide array of logics, which include, among others,
intuitionistic and distributive and general (non-distributive) lattice-based (modal) logics [10, 12, 7],
non-normal (regular) modal logics based on distributive lattices of arbitrary modal signature [36],
monotone modal logic [20], hybrid logics [16], many valued logics [32] and bi-intuitionistic and lattice-
based modal mu-calculus [4, 5, 6]. The main tools of this theory are a language-independent definition
of inductive formulas/inequalities based on the order-theoretic properties of the interpretations of
the logical connectives, and the algorithm ALBA, which computes the first-order correspondent of
input formulas/inequalities and is guaranteed to succeed on the inductive class. Subsequent work has
shown that the algorithm ALBA is much more versatile as a tool than initially expected. Indeed, a
suitable adaptation of ALBA has been used to compute the shape of the analytic rules equivalent to
given axioms so as to contribute to the quest of uniform methods to design analytic calculi for non-
classical logics [25, 33]. Other suitable modifications of the original algorithm have been used to prove
canonicity results in settings progressively further away from correspondence: Jo´nsson-style canonicity
[35], constructive canonicity [11], and canonicity via pseudo-correspondence [14]. In particular, in
[11], ALBA has been used to prove constructive canonicity, i.e. algebraic canonicity in a context
in which relational semantics is not defined in general. Interestingly, in the same paper, the proof
technique used to prove the main result has also been systematically related to the methodology used
to prove canonicity-via-correspondence. The contributions of the present paper can be understood as
providing yet another dimension to this story: indeed, the possibility semantics can be understood
as the relational incarnation of the general algebraic environment in which constructive canonicity is
proved.
Methodology. We analyze the correspondence phenomenon in possibility semantics using the dual
algebraic structures of (full) possibility frames, namely complete (not necessarily atomic) Boolean
algebras with complete operator, where atoms are not always available. For correspondence over
full possibility frames, we identify two different Boolean algebras with operator as the dual algebraic
structures of a given full possibility frame by viewing the full possibility frame in two different ways,
namely the Boolean algebra of regular open subsets BRO (when viewing the possibility frame as a
possibility frame itself) and the Boolean algebra of arbitrary subsets BK (when viewing the possibility
frame as a bimodal Kripke frame, see [44]), where a canonical order-embedding map e : BRO → BK
can be defined. The embedding e preserves arbitrary meets, therefore a left adjoint c : BK → BRO
of e can be defined, which sends a subset X of the domain W of possibilities to the smallest regular
open subset containing X . This left adjoint c plays an important role in the dual characterization of
the interpretations of nominals and the black connectives, which form the ground of the regular open
translation of the expanded modal language. In particular, we give an algebraic counterpart of Lemma
3.7 in [45] that every regular open element can be represented as the join of regular open closures of
singletons below it, therefore the regular open closures of singletons form the join-generators. When
it comes to canonicity, we prove a topological Ackermann lemma similar to [10, Lemma 9.3 and 9.4],
which forms the basis of the correspondence result with respect to filter-descriptive frames as well as
the canonicity result.
Structure of the paper. Section 2 presents preliminaries on possibility semantics, both frame-
theoretically and algebraically, as well as the duality theory background of possibility semantics.
Section 3 gives an algebraic analysis of the semantic environment of possibility semantics for the
interpretation of the expanded modal language, the details of which will be given in Section 4 together
with the regular open translation and the syntactic definition of Sahlqvist and inductive formulas. The
Ackermann Lemma Based Algorithm (ALBA) for possibility semantics is given in Section 5 as well
as some examples, with its soundness proof with respect to full possibility frames in Section 6 and
the proof that it succeeds on inductive formulas in Section 7. The soundness proof with respect to
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filter-descriptive possibility frames and the canonicity-via-correspondence proof are given in Section 8.
Section 9 provides some discussions, and gives some further directions.
2 Preliminaries on possibility semantics
In the present section we collect the preliminaries on possibility semantics. For more details, see e.g.
[29, Section 1 and 2] and [45].
2.1 Language
Given a set Prop of propositional variables, the basic modal language L is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ✷ϕ,
where p ∈ Prop. We define ϕ ∨ ψ := ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), ϕ → ψ := ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, ⊥ := p ∧ ¬p, ⊤ := ¬⊥ and
✸ϕ := ¬✷¬ϕ, respectively. We also use Prop(α) to denote the propositional variables occuring in α. 2
We will find it convenient to work on inequalities, i.e. expressions of the form ϕ ≤ ψ, the inter-
pretation of which is equivalent to the implicative formula ϕ→ ψ being true at any point in a model.
Throughout the paper, we will also make substantial use of quasi-inequalities, i.e. expressions of the
form ϕ1 ≤ ψ1 & . . . & ϕn ≤ ψn ⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ, where & is the meta-level conjunction and ⇒ is the
meta-level implication.
2.2 Downset topology
In the present subsection, we report on the definition of possibility frames and possibility models. We
will make use of the following auxiliary notions. For every partial order (W,⊑), a subset Y ⊆ W is
downward closed (or a down-set) if for all x, y ∈ W , if x ∈ Y and y ⊑ x, then y ∈ Y . For every
X ⊆W , the set ⇓X := {x ∈ W | (∃y ⊒ x)(y ∈ X)} is the smallest down-set containing X . The set of
all down-sets of (W,⊑) forms a topology on W , denoted by τ⊑, which we call the downset topology.
For any X ⊆ W , we let cl(X) := {x ∈ W | (∃y ⊑ x)(y ∈ X)} (resp. int(X) := {x ∈ W | (∀y ⊑
x)(y ∈ X)}) denote the closure (resp. interior) of X . We also let
RO(W, τ⊑) := {X ⊆W | int(cl(X)) = X}
denote the collection of regular open subsets of W . We say a set Y ⊆ W the regular open closure of
X if Y is the least regular open subset of W containing X , and denote Y = ro(X).
We collect some useful facts about the downset topology:
Proposition 2.1. (cf. [29, page 16-18]) For every partial order (W,⊑),
1. every regular open subset of (W, τ⊑) is a down-set, and hence a τ⊑-open subset.
2. ro(X) = int(cl(⇓ X)) for any subset X ⊆W .
3. ro(X) = int(cl(X)) for any X ∈ τ⊑.
4. ∅,W ∈ RO(W, τ⊑).
5. X ∩ Y ∈ RO(W, τ⊑) if X,Y ∈ RO(W, τ⊑).
6. int(cl(X ∪ Y )) ∈ RO(W, τ⊑) if X,Y ∈ RO(W, τ⊑).
7. int(W \X) ∈ RO(W, τ⊑) if X ∈ RO(W, τ⊑).
8. RO(W, τ⊑) is closed under arbitrary intersection (cf. [29, footnote 13 on page 17]).
2In the present paper we will consider only the modal language with only one unary modality. These results can be
easily generalized to languages with arbitrary signature, which is ongoing work.
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9. (RO(W, τ⊑),∅,W,∧,∨,−) is a Boolean algebra such that for all X,Y ∈ (RO(W, τ⊑),
X ∧ Y = X ∩ Y X ∨ Y = int(cl(X ∪ Y )) −X = int(W \X).
10. for all X,Y ∈ (RO(W, τ⊑),
X ⊃ Y := −X ∨ Y = int((W \X) ∪ Y )
2.3 Relational semantics
For every binary relation R on a set W , we denote R[X ] = {w ∈ W | (∃x ∈ X)Rxw} and R−1[X ] =
{w ∈ W | (∃x ∈ X)Rwx}, and denote R[w] := R[{w}] and R−1[w] := R−1[{w}], respectively. Below
we give a slightly different but equivalent definition of possibility frames than the one given in [29].
Definition 2.2 (Possibility frames and models). A possibility frame is a tuple F = (W,⊑, R,P), where
W 6= ∅ is the domain of F, the refinement relation3 ⊑ is a partial order onW , the accessibility relation
R is a binary relation4 on W , and the collection P ⊆ RO(W, τ⊑) of admissible subsets forms a sub-
Boolean algebra of RO(W, τ⊑) such that ✷P(X) = {w ∈ W | R[w] ⊆ X} ∈ P for any X ∈ P. A
pointed possibility frame is a pair (F, w) where w ∈W . A possibility model is a pair M = (F, V ) where
V : Prop→ P is a valuation on F. A possibility frame is full if P = RO(W, τ⊑).
It follows straightforwardly from the conditions above that P is endowed with the algebraic struc-
ture of a BAO. In general, for any possibility frame F = (W,⊑, R,P), the underlying full possibility
frame F♯ = (W,⊑, R,RO(W, τ⊑)) might not be well-defined, since RO(W, τ⊑) might not be closed un-
der the box operation arising from the relation R. However, in certain situations which we will discuss
in Remark 8.3, the underlying full possibility frame is well-defined.
Given any possibility model M = (W,⊑, R,P, V ) and any w ∈ W , the satisfaction relation is
defined as follows:
• F, V, w  p iff w ∈ V (p);
• F, V, w  ϕ ∧ ψ iff F, V, w  ϕ and F, V, w  ψ;
• F, V, w  ¬ϕ iff (∀v ⊑ w)(F, V, v 2 ϕ);
• F, V, w  ✷ϕ iff ∀v(Rwv ⇒ F, V, v  ϕ).
For any formula ϕ, we let JϕKM = {w ∈W | M, w  ϕ} denote the truth set of ϕ inM. The formula
ϕ is globally true on a possibility model M (notation: M  ϕ) if M, w  ϕ for every w ∈ W . Moreover,
ϕ is valid on a pointed possibility frame (F, w) (notation: F, w  ϕ) if F, V, w  ϕ for every valuation
V . We say that ϕ is valid on a possibility frame F (notation: F  ϕ) if ϕ is valid on (F, w) for every
w ∈ W . The definition of global truth for inequalities and quasi-inequalities is given as follows:
• F, V  ϕ ≤ ψ iff for all w ∈W , if F, V, w  ϕ then F, V, w  ψ;
• F, V &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ iff if F, V  ϕi ≤ ψi for all i then F, V  ϕ ≤ ψ.
An inequality (resp. quasi-inequality) is valid on F if it is globally true on (F, V ) for every valuation
V .
It is easy to check that the following truth conditions hold for defined connectives as well as
inequalities:
3We adopt the order of the refinement relation as in [29, 45], which is used in the theory of weak forcing [34], while
in the literature of intuitionistic logic, the order is typically the reverse order.
4In the literature, some interaction conditions are imposed between the accessibility relation and the refinement
relation (cf. [44]). Since these conditions are not needed for our treatment, we do not impose them and we do not discuss
them any further in the present paper.
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Proposition 2.3. The following equivalences hold for any possibility frame F = (W,⊑, R,P), any
valuation V and any w ∈W :
• F, V, w  ⊤: always;
• F, V, w  ⊥: never;
• F, V, w  ϕ ∨ ψ iff (∀v ⊑ w)(∃u ⊑ v)(F, V, u  ϕ or F, V, u  ψ);
• F, V, w  ϕ→ ψ iff (∀v ⊑ w)(F, V, v  ϕ ⇒ F, V, v  ψ);
• F, V, w  ✸ϕ iff (∀v ⊑ w)∃u(Rvu ∧ (∃t ⊑ u)(F, V, t  ϕ));
• F, V  ϕ→ ψ iff JϕKF,V ⊆ JψKF,V iff F, V  ϕ ≤ ψ;
• F  ϕ→ ψ iff F  ϕ ≤ ψ.
The following proposition can be understood as stating that the interpretation of modal formulas
on possibility frames and models can be obtained from the standard algebraic semantics for modal
logic via the duality established in [29]:
Proposition 2.4. For any possibility frame F = (W,⊑, R,P), any valuation V : Prop → P and any
w ∈ W ,
• J⊤KF,V =W ;
• J⊥KF,V = ∅;
• Jϕ ∧ ψKF,V = JϕKF,V ∩ JψKF,V ;
• Jϕ ∨ ψKF,V = ro(JϕKF,V ∪ JψKF,V ) = int(cl(JϕKF,V ∪ JψKF,V ));
• J¬ϕKF,V = int(W \ JϕKF,V );
• Jϕ→ ψKF,V = int((W \ JϕKF,V ) ∪ JψKF,V );
• J✷ϕKF,V = W \R−1[W \ JϕKF,V ];
• J✸ϕKF,V = int(R−1[cl(JϕKF,V )]).
2.4 Algebraic semantics
Thanks to the duality in [29], we will be able to work throughout the paper in the environment of the
dual algebras of the possibility frames, namely the Boolean algebras with operators.
Definition 2.5 (Boolean algebra with operator). A Boolean algebra with operator (BAO) is a tuple
B = (B,⊥,⊤,∧,∨,−,✷), where (B,⊥,⊤,∧,∨,−) is a Boolean algebra and moreover, ✷⊤ = ⊤ and
✷(a∧b) = ✷a∧✷b for any a, b ∈ B. The order on B is defined as a ≤ b iff a∧b = a. We will sometimes
abuse notation and use B to denote B.
For any BAO B, let B∂ denote its order-dual, and let B1 = B. For any n ∈ N , an n-order type ε
is an element of {1, ∂}n, and its i-th coordinate is denoted by εi. We omit n when it is clear from the
context. Let ε∂ denote the dual order type of ε, i.e. the order-type such that ε∂i = 1 (resp. ∂) if εi = ∂
(resp. 1). For any n-order type ε, we let Bε be the product algebra Bε1 × . . .× Bεn .
An assignment on B is a map θ : Prop → B, which can be extended to all formulas as usual. We
use ϕ(B,θ) or θ(ϕ) to denote the value of ϕ in B under θ. We say that a formula ϕ (resp. an inequality
ϕ ≤ ψ) is true on B under θ (notation: (B, θ)  ϕ, (B, θ)  ϕ ≤ ψ), if ϕ(B,θ) = ⊤ (resp. ϕ(B,θ) ≤ ψ(B,θ)),
and ϕ (resp. ϕ ≤ ψ) is valid on B (notation: B  ϕ, B  ϕ ≤ ψ) if (B, θ)  ϕ (resp. (B, θ)  ϕ ≤ ψ) for
every θ.
A quasi-inequality &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi) ⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ is true on B under θ (notation: (B, θ) &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤
ψi) ⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ) if ϕ(B,θ) ≤ ψ(B,θ) holds whenever ϕ
(B,θ)
i ≤ ψ
(B,θ)
i holds for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
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&
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ is valid on B (notation: B &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ) if (B, θ) &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤
ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ for every θ.
Another useful way to look at a formula ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) is to interpret it as an n-ary function
ϕB : Bn → B such that ϕB(a1, . . . , an) = θ(ϕ) where θ : Prop→ B satisfies θ(pi) = ai, i = 1, . . . , n.
Recall that an element b ∈ B is an atom if b 6= ⊥ and for any c ∈ B s.t. c ≤ b, either c = ⊥ or
c = b. Moreover, a modal operator ✷ on B is completely multiplicative if
∧
{✷a | a ∈ A} exists for any
A ⊆ B such that
∧
A exists, and
∧
{✷a | a ∈ A} = ✷(
∧
A). A BAO is:
(C) complete if the greatest lower bound
∧
A and least upper bound
∨
A exist for any A ⊆ B;
(A) atomic if for any a 6= ⊥ there exists some atom b ∈ B such that ⊥ 6= b ≤ a;
(V) completely multiplicative5 if ✷ is completely multiplicative.
A BAO is a CV-BAO if it is complete and completely multiplicative, and is a CAV-BAO if it is
complete, atomic and completely multiplicative, and other abbreviations are given in a similar way.
Notice that the definitions of completeness and atomicity also apply to Boolean algebras.
As to the correspondence between BAOs and possibility frames, the following definition provides
the frame-to-algebra direction:
Definition 2.6. For any possibility frame F = (W,⊑, R,P), let the BAO P of Definition 2.2 be the
BAO dual to F, denoted by BP. If F is a full possibility frame, then P = RO(W, τ⊑) and we refer to
BP as BRO (the regular open dual BAO of F).
Proposition 2.7. For any full possibility frame F, BRO is a CV-BAO.
The existence of the frame-to-algebra direction of the duality defined above induces a bijection
between valuations on F and interpretations of propositional variables into BP.
Definition 2.8. For any possibility frame F = (W,⊑, R,P), any valuation V on F can be associated
with the assignment θV : Prop → BP defined by θV (p) := V (p) for every p ∈ Prop. Conversely, any
assignment θ : Prop→ BP can be associated with the valuation Vθ : Prop→ P defined by Vθ(p) = θ(p)
for every p ∈ Prop.
It is easy to check the following equivalences hold:
Proposition 2.9. For any possibility frame F = (W,⊑, R,P), for any valuation V : Prop → P on
F, any assignment θ : Prop → P on BP, any w ∈ W , any formula ϕ, any inequality ϕ ≤ ψ, any
quasi-inequality &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ,
• F, V, w  ϕ iff w ∈ θV (ϕ);
• F, Vθ, w  ϕ iff w ∈ θ(ϕ);
• F  ϕ iff BP  ϕ;
• F, V  ϕ ≤ ψ iff BP, θV  ϕ ≤ ψ;
• F, Vθ  ϕ ≤ ψ iff BP, θ  ϕ ≤ ψ;
• F  ϕ ≤ ψ iff BP  ϕ ≤ ψ;
• F, V &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ iff BP, θV &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ;
• F, Vθ &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ iff BP, θ &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ;
• F &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ iff BP &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ.
5In [29], algebras satisfying condition (V) are called completely additive.
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The duality theoretic facts outlined above make it possible to transfer the development of cor-
respondence theory from frames to algebras, similarly to the way in which algebraic correspondence
is developed for Kripke frames. In particular, BRO will be the algebra where correspondence theory
over full possibility frames is developed. However, the essential difference between the correspondence
for Kripke semantics and the present setting is that the algebra BRO is not atomic in general (see
[29, Example 2.40]). This implies that some of the rules of the original ALBA-type algorithm (cf.
[9, 10]) for complex algebras of Kripke frames (namely, the so-called approximation rules which relied
on atomicity) are not going to be sound in this setting. The analysis of the semantic environment of
the regular open dual BAOs, developed in the next section, will give insights on how to design the
algorithm in this semantic setting.
3 Semantic environment for the language of ALBA
In the present section, we will provide the algebraic semantic environment for the correspondence
algorithm ALBA in the setting of possibility semantics. We will show the semantic properties which
will be used for the interpretation of the expanded modal language of the algorithm ALBA in Section
4.1.1. The first notable feature of this language is that it includes special variables (besides the
propositional variables), the so-called nominals, which in the original setting are interpreted as the
atoms of the complex algebras of Kripke frames. This interpretation of nominals pivots on the fact
that the complex algebras of Kripke frames are atomic, that is, are completely join-generated by their
atoms. Likewise, in order to define a suitable interpretation for the nominals in the possibility setting,
we need to find a class of elements which join-generate the complex algebra of any full possibility
frame. Towards this goal, our strategy will consist in defining a BAO BK in which the BAO BRO can
be order-embedded. This algebra will be used as an auxiliary tool to show that every element in BRO
can be represented as the join of regular open closures of atoms in BK. Hence, this will show that the
regular open closures of atoms in BK are a suitable class of interpretants for nominal variables.
The second notable feature of the expanded language of ALBA is that it includes additional modal
operators interpreted as the adjoints of the modal operators of the original language. In what follows,
we will show that also these connectives have a natural interpretation in BRO.
3.1 The auxiliary BAO BK
Clearly, any full possibility frame FRO = (W,⊑, R,RO(W, τ⊑)) can be associated with the bimodal
frame FK = (W,⊑, R), the complex algebra of which is the bimodal BAO BK (cf. [44]).
Diagrammatically, the CAV-BAO BK dually corresponds to the Kripke frame FK, and the CV-BAO
BRO to the full possibility frame FRO, e is the order-embedding which sends a regular open subset in BRO
to itself in BK, and U sends a full possibility frame to its underlying bimodal Kripke frame “forgetting”
the algebra RO(W, τ⊑) (and hence the restriction on the admissible valuations)
BRO
BK
FRO
FK
e U
∼=∂
∼=∂
The formal definition of the BAO BK is reported below:
Definition 3.1 (Full dual Boolean algebra with operators). For any full possibility frame F = (W,⊑
, R,RO(W, τ⊑)), the full dual Boolean algebra with operators (full dual BAO) BK
6 is defined as BK =
6Notice that here the “full” means that the carrier set is the powerset of W , rather than the “full” in “full possibility
frame”.
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(P (W ),∅,W,∩,∪,−,✷K,✷⊑), where ∩,∪,− are set-theoretic intersection, union and complementation
respectively, ✷K(a) = {w ∈W | R[w] ⊆ a}, and ✷⊑(a) = {w ∈W | (∀v ⊑ w)(v ∈ a)}.
It is easy to see that BK is a complete atomic Boolean algebra with complete operators. It is
also clear that the carrier set of the regular open dual BAO is a subset of the full dual BAO, hence
the natural embedding e : BRO →֒ BK is well defined and is an order-embedding. Notice that by
Proposition 2.1, arbitrary intersections of regular open sets in a downset topology are again regular
open, therefore e is completely meet-preserving. Notice also that ✷RO is the restriction of ✷K to BRO.
All these observations can be summarized as follows:
Lemma 3.2. e : BRO →֒ BK is a completely meet-preserving order-embedding such that e◦✷RO = ✷K◦e.
However, it is important to stress that, since BRO and BK have different definitions of join and
complementation, BRO is not a subalgebra of BK.
The next corollary follows immediately from the previous lemma (see e.g. [17, Proposition 7.34]):
Corollary 3.3. e : BRO →֒ BK has a left adjoint c : BK → BRO defined, for every a ∈ BK,
c(a) =
∧
RO
{b ∈ BRO | a ≤ e(b)}.
Clearly, c(X) = ro(X) for any X ⊆ W , Indeed, by definition c(X) =
∧
RO
{Y ∈ RO(W, τ⊑) | X ≤
e(Y )} =
⋂
{Y ∈ RO(W, τ⊑) | X ⊆ Y }, which is the least regular open set containing X . The closure
operator c will be referred to as the regular open closure map and c(a) as the regular open closure of
a. We let PsAt(BRO) := {c(x) | x ∈ At(BK)} (here PsAt stands for pseudo-atom, and At(B) denotes the
set of atoms in the BAO B) be the set of regular open closures of atoms in BK, which will be shown to
be the join-generators of BRO.
3.1.1 A class of interpretants for nominals
As mentioned ealy on, the key requirement for a suitable class of interpretants for nominals is that it
is join-dense in BRO. In what follows, we give a proof of this property for PsAt(BRO). This result has
already been proved in [45, Lemma 3.7]; we give an alternative proof in the dual algebraic setting. Let
us preliminarily recall that, by general facts of the theory of closure operators on posets, c ◦ e = IdBRO .
Proposition 3.4. For any a ∈ BRO,
a =
∨
RO
{c(x) | x ∈ At(BK) and x ≤ e(a)} =
∨
RO
{y ∈ PsAt(BRO) | y ≤ a}.
Proof. The first equality follows from the fact that c◦e = IdBRO and that left adjoint preserve arbitrary
existing joins; the second equality, from the definition of PsAt(BRO) and adjunction between c and e.
3.2 Interpreting the additional connectives of the expanded language of
ALBA
As mentioned early on, BRO and BK are both complete, and ✷RO : BRO → BRO and ✷K : BK → BK are
both completely meet-preserving. Thus both of them have left adjoints, which are denoted by ♦RO
and ♦K, respectively. They will be used as the semantic interpretation of the additional connective
in the expanded modal language in the next section. In what follows we will explicitly compute the
definitions of the adjoints.
Lemma 3.5. ♦K(X) = R[X ] for any X ⊆W .
Proof. By definition of adjunction, for any Y ∈ P (W ), w ∈ W ,
♦K({w}) ⊆ Y iff {w} ⊆ ✷K(Y )
iff {w} ⊆ {v ∈W | R[v] ⊆ Y }
iff R[w] ⊆ Y ,
Therefore ♦K({w}) = R[w]. Since left adjoints preserve existing joins,
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♦K(X) = ♦K(
⋃
{{w} | w ∈ X})
=
⋃
{♦K({w}) | w ∈ X}
=
⋃
{R[w] | w ∈ X}
= R[X ].
Lemma 3.6. ♦RO(a) = (c ◦♦K ◦ e)(a).
Proof. We have the following chain of equalities:
♦RO(a) =
∧
RO
{b ∈ BRO | a ≤ ✷RO(b)} (adjunction property)
=
∧
RO
{b ∈ BRO | e(a) ≤ (✷K ◦ e)(b)} (Lemma 3.2)
=
∧
RO
{b ∈ BRO | (♦K ◦ e)(a) ≤ e(b)} (definition of adjunction)
=
∧
RO
{b ∈ BRO | (c ◦♦K ◦ e)(a) ≤ b} (definition of adjunction)
= (c ◦♦K ◦ e)(a).
Corollary 3.7. ♦RO(X) = ro(R[X ]) for any X ∈ RO(W, τ⊑).
Proof. We have the following chain of equalities:
♦RO(X) = (c ◦♦K ◦ e)(X) (Lemma 3.6)
= (c ◦♦K)(X)
= c(R[X ]) (Lemma 3.5)
= ro(R[X ]). (Corollary 3.3)
4 Preliminaries on algorithmic correspondence
Our algorithmic correspondence and canonicity proofs are based on duality and order-theoretic insights,
and distill the order-theoretic properties from the concrete semantic setting. We will explain how we
work for the correspondence over full possibility frames. This methodology works in a similar way in
the setting of filter-descriptive possibility frames.
As we have already seen from Section 2.4, we have the dual equivalence between the full possibility
frame FRO and the regular open dual BAO BRO. Now we can understand the sketch of algorithmic
correspondence as follows (here we abuse notation to mix syntactic symbols and semantic objects, for
the convenience of understanding):
FRO  ϕ(~p) FRO FO(Pure(ϕ(~p)))
m m
BRO  (∀~p ∈ BRO)(ϕ(~p)) ⇔ BRO  (∀~i ∈ PsAt(BRO))Pure(ϕ(~p))
For the left arm of the “U-shaped” argument given above, the validity of ϕ(~p) is understood as
(∀~p ∈ BRO)(ϕ(~p)), where the interpretations of propositional variables range over elements in BRO. The
algorithm transforms ϕ(~p) into an equivalent set of pure quasi-inequalities Pure(ϕ(~p)) which does not
contain propositional variables, but only nominals7, and the validity of Pure(ϕ(~p)) can be understood
as (∀~i ∈ PsAt(BRO))(Pure(ϕ(~p))), where PsAt(BRO) is the collection of regular open closures of atoms
in BK rather than atoms in BRO, which serves as the set of join-generators in BRO. This interpretation
is the key to the soundness of the approximation rules, in the spirit of in [45, Lemma 3.7]. Once the
nominals and the other symbols in Pure(ϕ(~p)) have first-order translations, we have the first-order
7In lattice-based logic settings, there is another kind of variables called co-nominals (see e.g. [10]), which are interpreted
as co-atoms or complete meet-irreducibles. Since in the Boolean setting, co-nominals can be interpreted as the negation
of nominals, they are not really necessary here. In the remainder of the paper, we will not use co-nominals.
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translation FO(Pure(ϕ(~p))) of the pure quasi-inequalities, which is the first-order correspondent of
ϕ(~p) over full possibility frames.
Therefore, the ingredients for the algorithmic correspondence proof to go through can be listed as
follows:
• An expanded modal language as the syntax of the algorithm, as well as their interpretations in
BRO;
• An algorithm which transforms a given modal formula ϕ(~p) into equivalent pure quasi-inequalities
Pure(ϕ(~p));
• A soundness proof of the algorithm with respect to BRO;
• A syntactically identified class of formulas on which the algorithm is successful;
• A first-order correspondence language and first-order translation which transforms pure quasi-
inequalities into their equivalent first-order correspondents.
In the remainder of the paper, we will define an expanded modal language which the algorithm
will manipulate (Section 4.1.1), define the first-order correspondence language of possibility frames
(Section 4.1.2) and the counterpart of the standard translation into this language, which we refer
to as regular open translation (Section 4.1.3). We report on the definition of Sahlqvist and inductive
formulas (Section 4.2), and define a modified version of the algorithm ALBA suitable for the possibility
semantic environment (Section 5), show its soundness over regular open dual BAOs (Section 6) and
its success (Section 7) on Sahlqvist and inductive formulas. In Section 8 we show the soundness of the
algorithm over the dual BAOs of filter-descriptive possibility frames.
4.1 The expanded modal language and the regular open translation
In the present section, we will define the expanded modal language for the algorithm, the first-order
and second-order correspondence language, as well as the regular open translation of the expanded
modal language into the correspondence language. We will also show that the translation preserves
truth conditions.
4.1.1 The expanded modal language L+
The expanded modal language L+ is a proper expansion of the modal language. Apart from the
propositional variables and connectives in the modal language, there are also a set Nom of nominals, a
special kind of variables to be interpreted as elements in PsAt(BRO), and the black connectives ♦,, i.e.
the unary connectives to be interpreted as the adjoints of ✷ and ✸ respectively. The formal definition
of the formulas in the expanded modal language L+ is given as follows:
ϕ ::= p | i | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ✷ϕ | ♦ϕ,
where p ∈ Prop and i ∈ Nom. We also define ϕ := ¬♦¬ϕ, and the other abbreviations are defined
similar to the basic modal language. In the algorithm, it will be convenient to use the abbreviations
as primitive symbols in the definition of the rules.
In order to interpret the expanded modal language on possibility frames and the dual BAOs,
we need to extend the valuation V and assignment θ also to nominals. As we have already seen in
Section 3, every element in BRO can be represented as the join of elements in PsAt(BRO) ⊆ BRO =
RO(W, τ⊑). Therefore, we are going to interpret the nominals as elements in PsAt(BRO), i.e. V (i), θ(i) ∈
PsAt(BRO) ⊆ RO(W, τ⊑).
The satisfaction relation for the additional symbols will be given as follows in any possibility frame
F = (W,⊑, R,P):
Definition 4.1. • F, V, w  i iff w ∈ V (i);
• F, V, w  ♦ϕ iff (∀v ⊑ w)(∃u ⊑ v)(∃t ⊒ u)∃s(Rst and F, V, s  ϕ).
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Notice that V (i) is not necessarily in P, but it is always in RO(W, τ⊑). Similarly, P is not necessarily
closed under ♦RO, but RO(W, τ⊑) is. Therefore, when interpreting formulas in the expanded modal
language, we only restrict the interpretations of propositional variables to P (therefore also all formulas
in the basic modal language), and allow formulas in the expanded modal language to be interpreted
in RO(W, τ⊑). Truth set and validity are defined similarly to the basic modal language.
It is easy to check that the following facts hold for the expanded modal language:
Proposition 4.2. • F, V, w  ♦ϕ iff w ∈ ro(R[JϕKF,V ]);
• F, V, w  ϕ iff (∀v ⊑ w)(∀u ⊒ v)∀t(Rtu⇒ (∃s ⊑ t)(F, V, s  ϕ));
• J♦ϕKF,V = ♦ROJϕKF,V ;
• JϕKF,V = (−RO ◦♦RO ◦ −RO)(JϕKF,V ).
The next proposition shows that  is interpreted as the right adjoint of ✸:
Proposition 4.3. For any X,Y ∈ RO(W, τ⊑),
(−RO ◦✷RO ◦ −RO)(X) ⊆ Y iff X ⊆ (−RO ◦♦RO ◦ −RO)(Y ).
For the algebraic semantics of the expanded modal language, we use a kind of hybrid alge-
braic structures obtained from arbitrary possibility frames: consider a possibility frame F = (W,⊑
, R,P) (whose underlying full possibility frame is well-defined) and its underlying full possibility
frame F = (W,⊑, R,RO(W, τ⊑)), we dualize the latter to obtain the regular open dual BAO BRO =
(RO(W, τ⊑),∅,W,∧RO,∨RO,−RO,✷RO), and put an admissible set P on top of it and get a hybrid dual
BAO (BRO,P), which restricts the assignment of propositional variables to P, but still allows formulas
in the expanded modal language to range over RO(W, τ⊑). For the interpretation of the expanded
modal language, we require that θ(i) ∈ PsAt(BRO) and ♦ is interpreted as ♦RO : BRO → BRO. For the
definition of validity, we use the notation BRO P ϕ to indicate that the assignments of propositional
variables range over P (while the assignments of nominals range over PsAt(BRO)).
It is easy to check that Proposition 2.9 generalizes to the expanded modal language in the case
of full possibility frames. For the case of arbitrary possibility frames, we use the hybrid dual BAO
(BRO,P) and the adapted version of validity BRO P ϕ. The discussion above can be summarized as
follows:
Proposition 4.4. For any formula ϕ in the expanded language,
• For any full possibility frame FRO and its dual BAO BRO,
– FRO  ϕ iff BRO  ϕ;
– FRO  ϕ ≤ ψ iff BRO  ϕ ≤ ψ;
– FRO &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ iff BRO &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ.
• For any possibility frame FP and its hybrid dual BAO (BRO,P),
– FP  ϕ iff BRO P ϕ;
– FP  ϕ ≤ ψ iff BRO P ϕ ≤ ψ;
– FP &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ iff BRO P &
n
i=1(ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ.
4.1.2 The correspondence languages
In order to express the first-order correspondents of modal formulas, we need to define the first-
order and second-order correspondence language L1 and L2. The first-order correspondence language
L1 consists of a set of unary predicate symbols Pn, each of which corresponds to a propositional
variable pn, two binary relation symbols ⊑ and R corresponding to the refinement relation and the
accessibility relation respectively, a set of individual symbols in, each of which corresponds to a nominal
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in, and the quantifiers ∀x, ∃x are first-order, i.e. ranging over individual variables. The second-order
correspondence language L2 contains all the symbols from L1 as well as second-order quantifiers
∀PP, ∃PP over unary predicate variables. In addition, unary predicate symbols are interpreted as
admissible subsets, and the second-order quantifiers range over admissible subsets.
The semantic structures to interpret the first-order and second-order formulas are the possibility
models (F, V ) = (W,⊑, R,P, V ), where an individual symbol in is interpreted as a state in ∈ W such
that ro({in}) = V (in), a unary predicate symbols Pn is interpreted as V (pn) ∈ P, and the binary
relation symbols ⊑ and R are interpreted as the refinement relation and the accessibility relation
denoted by the same symbol, respectively. At the level of possibility frames, we will abuse notation
to take the unary predicate symbols Pn and the individual symbols in as variables and use quantifiers
over them. We use Jα(~x)KF,V to denote the n-tuples ~w ∈ Wn that make α(~x) true in the model (F, V ),
i.e. Jα(~x)KF,V := {~w ∈Wn | F, V  α[~w]}, which is called the truth set of α(~x) in (F, V ).
In the definition of correspondence between a modal formula and a first-order formula, we will
require the first-order formula to contain only binary relation symbols, and not contain any unary
predicate symbol. Now the definition can be given as follows in the setting of full possibility frames:
Definition 4.5. We say that a modal formula ϕ in the basic modal language L locally corresponds
to a first-order formula α(x) in the first-order correspondence language with no occurence of unary
predicate symbols, if for any full possibility frame F = (W,⊑, R,RO(W, τ⊑)), any w ∈ W , F, w  ϕ
iff F  α[w]. We say that ϕ globally corresponds to a first-order sentence α with no occurence of
unary predicate symbols, if for any full possibility frame F, F  ϕ iff F  α. For inequalities and
quasi-inequalities, the definition is similar.
The definition above can be easily adapted to the setting of filter-descriptive possibility frames and
so on.
4.1.3 The regular open translation
In the present section, we will give the first-order translation of the expanded modal language into the
first-order correspondence language, in the spirit of the standard translation in [2, Section 2.4]. Since
the translation is based on the semantic interpretation of modal formulas on the relational structures,
and in possibility semantics, the conditions about regular open sets play an important role, we will
call our translation regular open translation.
For the sake of convenience, we give the following definition:
Definition 4.6 (Syntactic regular open closure). (cf. [45, page 8]) Given a first-order formula α(x)
with at most x free, the syntactic regular open closure ROx(α(x)) is defined as (∀y ⊑ x)(∃z ⊑ y)(∃z′ ⊒
z)α(z′).
It is easy to see that the syntactic regular open closure of a formula is interpreted as the semantic
regular open closure of its corresponding truth set:
Proposition 4.7. (cf. [45, Lemma 3.8]) JROx(α(x))K
F,V = ro(Jα(x)KF,V ).
Since nominals are interpreted as elements in PsAt(BRO), i.e. regular open closures of singletons,
we will translate nominals to the syntactic regular open closure of the identity i = x, where i is the
individual symbol interpreted as a state in ∈ W such that ro({in}) = V (in). The connectives are
interpreted according to the definition of their satisfaction relations.
Now we are ready to give the regular open translation as follows:
Definition 4.8 (Regular open translation). (cf. [45, Definition 2.6]) The regular open translation of a
formula in the expanded modal language L+ into the first-order correspondence language L1 is given
as follows:
STx(i) := ROx(i = x);
STx(pi) := Pix;
STx(¬ϕ) := ∀y(y ⊑ x→ ¬STy(ϕ));
STx(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) := STx(ϕ1) ∧ STx(ϕ2);
STx(✷ϕ) := ∀y(Rxy → STy(ϕ));
STx(♦ϕ) := ROx(∃y(Ryx ∧ STy(ϕ))).
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By Proposition 2.3 and 4.2, we can also take ⊤,⊥,∨,→,✸, as primitive connectives and define
the following translation:
Definition 4.9 (Regular open translation continued).
STx(⊤) := ⊤;
STx(⊥) := ⊥;
STx(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) := (∀y ⊑ x)(∃z ⊑ y)(STz(ϕ1) ∨ STz(ϕ2));
STx(ϕ1 → ϕ2) := (∀y ⊑ x)(STy(ϕ1)→ STy(ϕ2));
STx(✸ϕ) := (∀y ⊑ x)∃z(Ryz ∧ (∃w ⊑ z)(STw(ϕ));
STx(ϕ) := (∀y ⊑ x)(∀z ⊒ y)∀w(Rwz ⇒ (∃v ⊑ w)(STv(ϕ)).
The following proposition justifies the translation defined above:
Proposition 4.10. (cf. [45, Lemma 2.8]) For any possibility frame F = (W,⊑, R,P), any valuation
V on F, any w ∈W and any formula ϕ(~p) in L+,
• F, V, w  ϕ(~p) iff F, V  STx(ϕ(~p))[w];
• F, V  ϕ(~p) iff F, V  ∀xSTx(ϕ(~p));
• F, w  ϕ(~p) iff F  ∀P ~P∀~iSTx(ϕ(~p))[w];
• F  ϕ(~p) iff F  ∀P ~P∀~i∀xSTx(ϕ(~p));
• F, V  ϕ(~p) ≤ ψ(~p) iff F, V  ∀x(STx(ϕ(~p))→ STx(ψ(~p)));
• F  ϕ(~p) ≤ ψ(~p) iff F  ∀P ~P∀~i∀x(STx(ϕ(~p))→ STx(ψ(~p)));
• F, V  &
n
j=1(ϕj(~p) ≤ ψj(~p)) ⇒ ϕ(~p) ≤ ψ(~p) iff F, V 
∧n
j=1 ∀x(STx(ϕj(~p)) → STx(ψj(~p))) →
∀x(STx(ϕ(~p))→ STx(ψ(~p)));
• F &
n
j=1(ϕj(~p) ≤ ψj(~p))⇒ ϕ(~p) ≤ ψ(~p) iff F, V  ∀
P ~P∀~i(
∧n
j=1 ∀x(STx(ϕj(~p))→ STx(ψj(~p)))→
∀x(STx(ϕ(~p))→ STx(ψ(~p)))).
where ~P are the unary predicate symbols corresponding to ~p.
Proof. By induction on the structure of ϕ and the satisfaction relation for each connective and variable,
as well as the semantics of the first-order correspondence language.
Remark 4.11. In fact, since unary predicate symbols are interpreted only as admissible subsets
(therefore regular open subsets), and the truth set of every formula ϕ is a regular open subset, there
are some first-order formulas valid on all full possibility frames which are not first-order theorems
(e.g. STx(ϕ) ↔ (∀y ⊑ x)(∃z ⊑ y)(∃w ⊒ z)STw(ϕ)). As a result, we have different ways to obtain
translations. For example, if we obtain the translation of ϕ→ ψ directly from the syntactic definition
of →, then we would have something different:
STx(ϕ1 → ϕ2) := (∀y ⊑ x)(∃z ⊑ y)(((∀w ⊑ z)¬STw(ϕ1)) ∨ STz(ϕ2))
In fact, the translation given above is equivalent to the one in Definition 4.9:
J(∀y ⊑ x)(∃z ⊑ y)(((∀w ⊑ z)¬STw(ϕ1)) ∨ STz(ϕ2))K
F,V = J¬ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2K
F,V ,
and
J(∀y ⊑ x)(STy(ϕ1)→ STy(ϕ2))K
F,V = Jϕ1 → ϕ2K
F,V ,
which are the same.
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4.2 Sahlqvist and inductive formulas
In the present section, we will report on the definitions of sahlqvist and inductive inequalities for
classical modal formulas. Sahlqvist formulas are very well known and their definition can be found
e.g. in [2, Definition 3.51]. Inductive formulas are defined by Goranko and Vakarelov in [24]. However,
because in the following sections we are going to make crucial use of the order-theoretic properties
of the algebraic interpretations of the logical connectives,in the present section we will specialize the
general definition of adopted in unified correspondence to the signature of classical modal logic. Our
presentation follows e.g. [14, 15, 36].
Definition 4.12 (Order-type of propositional variables). We will consider the order-type of tuples of
propositional variables (p1, . . . , pn), and say that pi has order-type 1 (resp. ∂) if εi = 1 (resp. εi = ∂),
and denote ε(pi) = 1 (resp. ε(pi) = ∂) or ε(i) = 1 (resp. ε(i) = ∂).
Definition 4.13 (Signed generation tree). (cf. [15, Definition 4]) The positive (resp. negative) gener-
ation tree of any given formula ϕ is defined by first labelling the root of the generation tree of ϕ with
+ (resp. −), and then labelling the children nodes as follows:
• Assign the same sign to the children nodes of any node labelled with ✷,✸,∨,∧;
• Assign the opposite sign to the child node of any node labelled with ¬;
• Assign the opposite sign to the first child node and the same sign to the second child node of
any node labelled with →.
Nodes in signed generation trees are positive (resp. negative) if they are signed + (resp. −).
Signed generation trees will be used in the environment of inequalities ϕ ≤ ψ, where we will use
the positive generation tree +ϕ and the negative one −ψ. We will also say that an inequality ϕ ≤ ψ
is uniform in a variable p if all occurrences of p in +ϕ and −ψ have the same sign, and that ϕ ≤ ψ
is ε-uniform in an array ~p if ϕ ≤ ψ is uniform in p, occurring with the sign indicated by ε, for each
propositional variable p in ~p.
For any given formula ϕ(p1, . . . pn), any order-type ε over n, and any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, an ε-critical node
in a signed generation tree of ϕ is a leaf node +pi when εi = 1 or −pi when εi = ∂. An ε-critical
branch in a signed generation tree is a branch from an ε-critical node. The ε-critical occurrences are
intended to be those which the algorithm ALBA will solve for. We say that +ϕ (resp. −ϕ) agrees with
ε, and write ε(+ϕ) (resp. ε(−ϕ)), if every leaf node in the signed generation tree of +ϕ (resp. −ϕ) is
ε-critical.
We will also use the notation +ψ ≺ ∗ϕ (resp. −ψ ≺ ∗ϕ) to indicate that the subformula ψ inherits
the positive (resp. negative) sign from the signed generation tree ∗ϕ, where ∗ ∈ {+,−}. We will
write ε(γ) ≺ ∗ϕ (resp. ε∂(γ) ≺ ∗ϕ) to indicate that the signed generation subtree γ, with the sign
inherited from ∗ϕ, agrees with ε (resp. with ε∂). We say that a propositional variable p is positive
(resp. negative) in ϕ if +p ≺ +ϕ (resp. −p ≺ +ϕ).
Definition 4.14. (cf. [15, Definition 5]) Nodes in signed generation trees are called ∆-adjoints, syntac-
tically left residual (SLR), syntactically right adjoint (SRA), and syntactically right residual (SRR)8,
according to Table 1.
A branch in a signed generation tree is called a good branch if it is the concatenation of two paths
P1 and P2, one of which might be of length 0, such that P1 is a path from the leaf consisting (apart
from variable nodes) of PIA-nodes only, and P2 consists (apart from variable nodes) of Skeleton-nodes
only. A good branch will be called excellent if P1 consists of SRA nodes only.
Definition 4.15 (Sahlqvist and inductive inequalities). (cf. [15, Definition 6]) For any order-type
ε and any irreflexive and transitive binary relation <Ω on p1, . . . pn, the signed generation tree ∗ϕ
(∗ ∈ {−,+}) of a formula ϕ(p1, . . . pn) is (Ω, ε)-inductive if
1. for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, every ε-critical branch with leaf pi is good (cf. Definition 4.14);
8For explanations of the terminologies here, we refer to [36, Remark 3.24].
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Skeleton PIA
∆-adjoints SRA
+ ∨ ∧
− ∧ ∨
+ ∧ ✷ ¬
− ∨ ✸ ¬
SLR SRR
+ ∧ ✸ ¬
− ∨ ✷ ¬ →
+ ∨ →
− ∧
Table 1: Skeleton and PIA nodes.
2. every SRR-node in the critical branch is either ⋆(γ, β) or ⋆(β, γ), where the critical branch is
in β, and
(a) ε∂(γ) ≺ ∗ϕ (cf. the discussion before Definition 4.14), and
(b) pk <Ω pi for every pk that occurs in γ.
For any order-type ε, the signed generation tree ∗ϕ of a formula ϕ(p1, . . . pn) is ε-Sahlqvist if for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, every ε-critical branch with leaf pi is excellent (cf. Definition 4.14).
We will refer to<Ω as the dependence order on the variables. An inequality ϕ ≤ ψ is (Ω, ε)-Sahlqvist
(resp. ε-inductive) if the signed generation trees +ϕ and −ψ are (Ω, ε)-Sahlqvist (resp. ε-inductive).
An inequality ϕ ≤ ψ is Sahlqvist (resp. inductive) if it is (Ω, ε)-Sahlqvist (ε-inductive) for some (Ω, ε).
5 The algorithm ALBA for possibility semantics
In the present section, we will give the algorithm ALBA for possibility semantics, which is similar
to the version in [11, 12], especially when it comes to the approximation rules. ALBA receives an
inequality ϕ ≤ ψ as input and then proceeds in the following three stages:
The first stage is the preprocessing stage, which eliminates all uniformly occurring propositional
variables, and exhaustively apply the distribution and splitting rules. This stage produces a finite
number of inequalities, ϕ′i ≤ ψ
′
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then the inequalities are rewritten as initial quasi-
inequalities &Si ⇒ Ineqi, represented as pairs (Si, Ineqi) called systems, where each Si is initialized to
the empty set and each Ineqi is initialized to ϕ
′
i ≤ ψ
′
i.
The second stage is the reduction and elimination stage, which applies the transformation rules to
transform (Si, Ineqi) into a system which does not contain propositional variables, but only nominals.
Such a system will be called pure. Among all the rules, the Ackermann-rules eliminate the propositional
variables, and the other rules rewrite the system to make the Ackermann rules applicable. When all
propositional variables are eliminated, the algorithm produces pure quasi-inequalities &Si ⇒ Ineqi.
The third stage is the output stage. If some of the systems cannot be purified, then the algorithm
reports failure and terminate. Otherwise, the algorithm outputs the conjunction of the pure quasi-
inequalities &Si ⇒ Ineqi as well as its regular open translation, which we denote by ALBA(ϕ ≤ ψ)
and FO(ϕ ≤ ψ), respectively.
The three stages are reported on in detail below:
Stage 1: Preprocessing and initialization ALBA receives an inequality ϕ ≤ ψ as input.
In the signed generation tree of +ϕ and −ψ,
1. Apply the distribution rules:
(a) Push down +✸,+∧, −¬ and − →, by distributing them over nodes labelled with +∨ which
are Skeleton nodes, and
(b) Push down −✷,−∨, +¬ and − →, by distributing them over nodes labelled with −∧ which
are Skeleton nodes.
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2. Apply the monotone and antitone variable-elimination rules:
α(p) ≤ β(p)
α(⊥) ≤ β(⊥)
β(p) ≤ α(p)
β(⊤) ≤ α(⊤)
where β(p) is positive in p and α(p) is negative in p.
3. Apply the splitting rules:
α ≤ β ∧ γ
α ≤ β α ≤ γ
α ∨ β ≤ γ
α ≤ γ β ≤ γ
After applying the rules above exhaustively, ALBA produces a set of inequalities {ϕ′i ≤ ψ
′
i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Then the inequalities are rewritten as initial quasi-inequalities &Si ⇒ Ineqi, represented as pairs
(Si, Ineqi) called systems, where each Si is initialized to the empty set and each Ineqi is initialized to
ϕ′i ≤ ψ
′
i. Each initial system is processed separately in Stage 2, where we will omit indices i.
Stage 2: Reduction and elimination This stage aims at eliminating all propositional variables
from a system (S, Ineq). This is done by the following approximation rules, residuation rules, splitting
rules, and Ackermann-rules, collectively called reduction rules. The formulas and inequalities in this
subsection are from the expanded modal language with nominals and black connectives.
Approximation rules. There are four approximation rules. Each of these rules simplifies Ineq and
adds an inequality to S. The notation ϕ(!x) indicate that x occurs only once in ϕ, and the branch of
ϕ(!x) starting at x means the path from x to the root.
Left-positive approximation rule.
(S, ϕ′(γ/!x) ≤ ψ′)
(L+A)
(S∪{i ≤ γ}, ϕ′(i/!x) ≤ ψ′)
where +x ≺ +ϕ′(!x), the branch of +ϕ′(!x) starting at +x is SLR, γ belongs to the basic modal
language and i is a nominal variable not occurring in S or ϕ′(γ/!x) ≤ ψ′.
Left-negative approximation rule.
(S, ϕ′(γ/!x) ≤ ψ′)
(L−A)
(S∪{γ ≤ ¬i}, ϕ′(¬i/!x) ≤ ψ′)
where −x ≺ +ϕ′(!x), the branch of +ϕ′(!x) starting at −x is SLR, γ belongs to the basic modal
language and i is a nominal variable not occurring in S or ϕ′(γ/!x) ≤ ψ′.
Right-positive approximation rule.
(S, ϕ′ ≤ ψ′(γ/!x))
(R+A)
(S∪{i ≤ γ}, ϕ′ ≤ ψ′(i/!x))
where +x ≺ −ψ′(!x), the branch of −ψ′(!x) starting at +x is SLR, γ belongs to the basic modal
language and i is a nominal variable not occurring in S or ϕ′ ≤ ψ′(γ/!x).
Right-negative approximation rule.
(S, ϕ′ ≤ ψ′(γ/!x))
(R−A)
(S∪{γ ≤ ¬i}, ϕ′ ≤ ψ′(¬i/!x))
where −x ≺ −ψ′(!x), the branch of −ψ′(!x) starting at −x is SLR, γ belongs to the basic modal
language and i is a nominal variable not occurring in S or ϕ′ ≤ ψ′(γ/!x)).
We will restrict the applications of approximation rules to nodes !x giving rise to maximal SLR
branches, i.e. branches that cannot be extended further. Such applications will be called pivotal. Also,
executions of ALBA in which approximation rules are applied only pivotally will be referred to as
pivotal.
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Residuation rules. These rules rewrite a chosen inequality in S into another inequality:
✸γ ≤ δ
(✸-Res)
γ ≤ δ
¬γ ≤ δ
(¬-Res-Left)
¬δ ≤ γ
γ ≤ ✷δ
(✷-Res)
♦γ ≤ δ
γ ≤ ¬δ
(¬-Res-Right)
δ ≤ ¬γ
γ ∧ δ ≤ β
(∧-Res-1)
γ ≤ δ → β
γ ≤ δ ∨ β
(∨-Res-1)
γ ∧ ¬δ ≤ β
γ ∧ δ ≤ β
(∧-Res-2)
δ ≤ γ → β
γ ≤ δ ∨ β
(∨-Res-2)
γ ∧ ¬β ≤ δ
γ ≤ δ → β
(→-Res-1)
γ ∧ δ ≤ β
γ ≤ δ → β
(→-Res-2)
δ ≤ γ → β
Right Ackermann-rule.
({αi ≤ p | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {βj(p) ≤ γj(p) | 1 ≤ j ≤ m}, Ineq)
(RAR)
({βj(
∨n
i=1 αi) ≤ γj(
∨n
i=1 αi) | 1 ≤ j ≤ m}, Ineq)
where:
• p does not occur in α1, . . . , αn or in Ineq,
• β1(p), . . . , βm(p) are positive in p, and
• γ1(p), . . . , γm(p) are negative in p.
Left Ackermann-rule.
({p ≤ αi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {βj(p) ≤ γj(p) | 1 ≤ j ≤ m}, Ineq)
(LAR)
({βj(
∧n
i=1 αi) ≤ γj(
∧n
i=1 αi) | 1 ≤ j ≤ m}, Ineq)
where:
• p does not occur in α1, . . . , αn or in Ineq,
• β1(p), . . . , βm(p) are negative in p, and
• γ1(p), . . . , γm(p) are positive in p.
Stage 3: Success, failure and output If Stage 2 succeeded in eliminating all propositional vari-
ables from each system, then for each i, the system becomes (Si, Ineqi), where Si = {ϕik(~ji) ≤ ψik(~ji)}k,
Ineqi is ϕi(
~ji) ≤ ψi(~ji). The algorithm returns the conjunction of these purified quasi-inequalities and
its regular open translation
∧
i
∀~ji(
∧
k
(∀x(STx(ϕik(~ji))→ STx(ψik(~ji))))→ ∀x(STx(ϕi(~ji))→ STx(ψi(~ji)))),
denoted by ALBA(ϕ ≤ ψ) and FO(ϕ ≤ ψ), respectively. Otherwise, the algorithm reports failure and
terminates.
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Example 5.1. Let us consider the following inequality ✷p ≤ p.
In the first stage, no rules are applied, so the initial system is
(∅,✷p ≤ p).
In the second stage, by applying the left-positive approximation rule, we get
({i ≤ ✷p}, i ≤ p);
then by the right-negative approximation rule, we get
({i ≤ ✷p, p ≤ ¬j}, i ≤ ¬j);
then by the residuation rule, we get
({♦i ≤ p, p ≤ ¬j}, i ≤ ¬j);
then by the right Ackermann rule, we get
({♦i ≤ ¬j}, i ≤ ¬j);
this system is equivalent to the following pure-inequality:
i ≤ ♦i.
In the third stage, the first-order correspondent is given as follows:
∀i∀x(STx(i)→ STx(♦i))
∀i∀x(ROx(x = i)→ STx(♦i))
∀i∀x(ROx(x = i)→ ROx(∃y(Ryx ∧ ROy(y = i)))).
As we can see from this example, the first-order correspondent of modal formulas will become
much more complicated even for very simple input.
6 Soundness
In the present section, we will prove the soundness of the algorithm with respect to regular open dual
BAOs of full possibility frames. For most of the rules, the proof is similar to existing settings [11, 12],
and hence omitted. We will focus on the approximation rules, which are the only rules dealing with
the variant interpretations of nominals.
Theorem 6.1 (Soundness). If ALBA succeeds on an input inequality ϕ ≤ ψ and outputs FO(ϕ ≤ ψ),
then for any full possibility frame FRO,
FRO  ϕ ≤ ψ iff FRO  FO(ϕ ≤ ψ).
Proof. The proof goes similarly to [11, Theorem 5.1]. Let ϕi ≤ ψi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n denote the inequalities
produced by preprocessing ϕ ≤ ψ after Stage 1, and (Si, Ineqi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n denote the corresponding
quasi-inequalities produced by ALBA after Stage 2. It suffices to show the equivalence from (1) to (7)
given below:
FRO  ϕ ≤ ψ (1)
BRO  ϕ ≤ ψ (2)
BRO  ϕi ≤ ψi, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (3)
BRO &∅⇒ ϕi ≤ ψi, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (4)
BRO &Si ⇒ Ineqi, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (5)
BRO  ALBA(ϕ ≤ ψ) (6)
FRO  FO(ϕ ≤ ψ) (7)
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• The equivalence between (1) and (2) follows from Proposition 4.4;
• to show the equivalence of (2) and (3), it suffices to show the soundness of the rules in Stage 1,
which can be proved in the same way as in [11, Theorem 5.1];
• the equivalence between (3) and (4) is immediate;
• the equivalence between (4) and (5) follows from Propositions 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 below;
• the equivalence between (5) and (6) is again immediate;
• the equivalence between (6) and (7) follows from Propositions 4.4 and 4.10.
Therefore, it remains to show the soundness of Stage 2, for which it suffices to show the soundness
of the approximation rules, the residuation rules, the Ackermann rules and the splitting rules. For
the residuation rules, the only property needed is the adjunction property, and the proofs are similar
to existing settings (see e.g. [10, Lemma 8.4]), and hence are omitted. For the splitting rules, their
soundness are immediate. For the Ackermann rules, since the nominals and propositional variables are
interpreted as elements in BRO, and the basic and black connectives are all interpreted as operations
from (products of) BRO to BRO, the “minimal valuation” formula is always interpreted as an element
in BRO, therefore the soundness proof of the Ackermann lemmas are the same as [12, Lemma 6.3, 6.4].
The only rules which need special attention are the approximation rules. Since they are order-dual to
each other, it suffices to focus on one of these rules.
Let us consider the left-positive approximation rule. Consider a system (S, ϕ(α, γ1, . . . , γn) ≤ ψ)
where α is the formula to be approximated, and the regular open dual BAO BRO and assignment θ
where the system is interpreted. By Proposition 3.4, α(BRO,θ) =
∨
RO
{x ∈ PsAt(BRO) | x ≤ α(BRO,θ)}.
The soundness of the left-positive approximation rule is justified by the following proposition:
Proposition 6.2. Given a regular open dual BAO BRO and an assignment θ on BRO,
(BRO, θ) &S ⇒ ϕ(α, γ1, . . . , γn) ≤ ψ
iff for any x ∈ PsAt(BRO),
(BRO, θ
′
x)  j ≤ α &&S ⇒ ϕ(j, γ1, . . . , γn) ≤ ψ,
where θ′x is the j-variant of θ such that θ
′
x(j) = x and θ
′
x agrees with θ on other variables.
Proof. First of all, by the requirement of the approximation rule, we have that ϕ( , γ1, . . . , γn) is com-
pletely join-preserving in the empty coordinate. By Proposition 3.4, α(BRO,θ) =
∨
RO
{x ∈ PsAt(BRO) |
x ≤ α(BRO,θ)}. By complete distributivity, we have9:
(BRO, θ)  (&S) ⇒ ϕ(α, γ1, . . . , γn) ≤ ψ
iff (&S)⇒ ϕ(
∨
RO
{x ∈ PsAt(BRO) | x ≤ α}, γ1, . . . , γn) ≤ ψ
iff (&S)⇒
∨
RO
{ϕ(x, γ1, . . . , γn) | x ∈ PsAt(BRO) and x ≤ α} ≤ ψ
iff (&S)⇒ (∀x ∈ PsAt(BRO) s.t. x ≤ α)(ϕ(x, γ1, . . . , γn) ≤ ψ)
iff (∀x ∈ PsAt(BRO) s.t. x ≤ α)(&S ⇒ ϕ(x, γ1, . . . , γn) ≤ ψ)
iff (∀x ∈ PsAt(BRO))(x ≤ α&&S ⇒ ϕ(x, γ1, . . . , γn) ≤ ψ)
iff (∀x ∈ PsAt(BRO))(x ≤ α(BRO,θ
′
x
)&(&S)(BRO,θ
′
x
) ⇒ ϕ(BRO,θ
′
x
)(x, γ
(BRO,θ
′
x
)
1 , . . . , γ
(BRO,θ
′
x
)
n ) ≤ ψ(BRO,θ
′
x
))
iff (∀x ∈ PsAt(BRO))((BRO, θ′x)  (j ≤ α&&S ⇒ ϕ(j, γ1, . . . , γn) ≤ ψ)).
Notice that j does not occur in S, α, ϕ, ψ, γ1, . . . , γn.
9For simplicity of notation, we omit the superscript (BRO , θ) of formulas and inequalities except for the last but one
line; indeed, in the last two lines, the interpretation is in (BRO, θ
′
x
), and in other lines, the interpretation is in (BRO, θ).
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Notice again that here we interpret the nominals as regular opens closures of atoms in the full dual
BAO rather than atoms or complete join-irreducibles since they might not be available in BRO.
By the proposition above, we have the soundness of the left-positive approximation rule as an easy
corollary:
Proposition 6.3. The left-positive approximation rule is sound.
By order-dual arguments, the other three approximation rules are sound:
Proposition 6.4. The left-negative approximation rule, the right-positive approximation rule and the
right-negative approximation rule are sound.
Following from standard soundness proof of ALBA [10, Lemma 8.3, 8.4], we have the following:
Proposition 6.5. The distribution rules, the splitting rules, the monotone and antitone rules and the
residuation rules are sound.
For the Ackermann rules, the proof is also similar. It is worth mentioning that all the formulas in
the expanded modal language are interpreted in BRO, as well as that we are working at the discrete
duality level, therefore the topological Ackermann lemmas (cf. [10, Lemma 9.3, 9.4]) are not needed
in the soundness proof here.
Proposition 6.6. The Ackermann rules are sound.
7 Success
The proof that ALBA succeeds on inductive inequalities goes similarly to [12], therefore in what follows
we will only sketch its main lines without giving details, and refer the reader to [12] for an exhaustive
treatment.
The following definition is meant to describe the shape of the inequality after Stage 1:
Definition 7.1. An (Ω, ε)-inductive inequality is called definite if all Skeleton nodes are SLR nodes
in its critical branches.
Lemma 7.2. Let {ϕi ≤ ψi} be the set of inequalities obtained after preprocessing an (Ω, ε)-inductive
inequality ϕ ≤ ψ. Then each ϕi ≤ ψi is a definite (Ω, ε)-inductive inequality.
The following definition describes the shape of a system after approximation rules have been
exhaustively applied pivotally until no propositional variables remain in Ineq:
Definition 7.3. A system (S, Ineq) is called (Ω, ε)-stripped if Ineq is pure and for each ξ ≤ χ ∈ S, the
following conditions hold:
1. one of +χ and −ξ is pure, and the other is (Ω, ε)-inductive;
2. every ε-critical branch in +χ and −ξ is PIA.
Lemma 7.4. For any definite (Ω, ε)-inductive inequality ϕ ≤ ψ, the system (∅, ϕ ≤ ψ) can be rewritten
into an (Ω, ε)-stripped system by the application of approximation rules.
The next definition describes the shape of a system after exhaustively applying reduction rules
other than the Ackermann rules:
Definition 7.5. An (Ω, ε)-stripped system (S, Ineq) is Ackermann-ready with respect to pi with εi = 1
(resp. εi = ∂) if every ξ ≤ χ ∈ S has one of the following forms:
1. ξ ≤ pi with ξ pure (resp. pi ≤ χ with χ pure), or
2. ξ ≤ χ where −ξ or +χ are ε∂-uniform in pi.
20
Notice that if a system is Ackermann-ready with respect to pi, then the right or left Ackermann-rule
(depending on whether εi = 1 or εi = ∂) is applicable.
The next lemma states that an (Ω, ε)-stripped system can be equivalently transformed into one in
which the Ω-minimal variables can be eliminated:
Lemma 7.6. If (S, Ineq) is (Ω, ε)-stripped and pi is Ω-minimal among the remaining propositional
variables occurring in (S, Ineq), then (S, Ineq) can be rewritten by the application of residuation and
splitting rules into a system which is Ackermann-ready with respect to pi.
The next lemma guarantees that the process of eliminating one propositional variable can be
repeated as needed:
Lemma 7.7. After applying the Ackermann rule to an (Ω, ε)-stripped system which is Ackermann-
ready with respect to pi, a system is obtained which is again (Ω, ε)-stripped.
Therefore, all propositional variables can be eliminated from an (Ω, ε)-stripped system, by repeat-
edly applying Ackermann rules. The discussion above outlines the proof of the following:
Theorem 7.8. ALBA succeeds on all inductive inequalities.
8 Canonicity
In the present section, we prove that inductive inequalities are filter-canonical. Our proof is alter-
native to the one given by Holliday [29, Theorem 7.20]. Indeed, Holliday’s proof follows from the
constructive canonicity of inductive inequalities proved in [11], observing that the filter completions of
BAOs coincide with their constructive canonical extensions (cf. [29, Theorem 5.46]). In this section,
we make use of the possibility semantics counterpart of the canonicity-via-correspondence argument,
which is a variation of the standard U-shaped argument represented in the diagram below. For this
U-shaped argument to be supported, we need to prove that ALBA is sound also with respect to the
filter-descriptive possibility frames (see Definition 8.2), i.e. the dual relational structure of Boolean
algebras with operators in the framework of possibility semantics. Hence, in what follows, we will
mainly focus on this aspect.
FFD  ϕ(~p) ≤ ψ(~p) FRO  ϕ(~p) ≤ ψ(~p)
m m
BRO FD ϕ(~p) ≤ ψ(~p) BRO  ϕ(~p) ≤ ψ(~p)
m m
BRO FD (∀~p ∈ BFD)(ϕ(~p) ≤ ψ(~p)) BRO  (∀~p ∈ BRO)(ϕ(~p) ≤ ψ(~p))
m m
BRO FD (∀~i ∈ PsAt(BRO))Pure(ϕ(~p) ≤ ψ(~p)) BRO  (∀~i ∈ PsAt(BRO))Pure(ϕ(~p) ≤ ψ(~p))
m m
FFD FO(Pure(ϕ(~p) ≤ ψ(~p))) ⇔ FRO FO(Pure(ϕ(~p) ≤ ψ(~p)))
Here BFD denote the dual BAO of the filter-descriptive possibility frame FFD, FRO is the underlying
full possibility frame of FFD, and BRO is the dual BAO of FRO.
We will first provide the semantic environment of the present section, i.e. filter-descriptive pos-
sibility frames and canonical extensions in Section 8.1. Section 8.2 gives the soundness proof of the
algorithm with respect to (the dual BAOs of) filter-descriptive possibility frames, where the topological
Ackermann lemmas are given. The correspondence and canonicity results are collected in Section 8.3.
8.1 Filter-descriptive possibility frames and canonical extensions
In the present section, we will collect basic definitions of filter-descriptive possibility frames as well as
canonical extensions. For more details, the reader is referred to [29] and [3].
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8.1.1 Filter-descriptive possibility frames
In [29], Holliday introduced filter-descriptive possibility frames, i.e. the possibility semantics counter-
part of descriptive general (Kripke) frames [2, Section 5.5], in which restrictions on the admissible set
are imposed. The following definition is one of these restrictions.
Definition 8.1 (Tightness). (cf. [29, Definition 4.31]) A possibility frame F = (W,⊑, R,P) is said to
be
• R-tight, if (∀w, v ∈W )(∀X ∈ P(w ∈ ✷P (X)⇒ v ∈ X)⇒ wRv);
• ⊑-tight, if (∀w, v ∈W )(∀X ∈ P(w ∈ X ⇒ v ∈ X)⇒ v ⊑ w);
• tight, if it is both R-tight and ⊑-tight.
The filter-descriptive possibility frames are introduced as below:
Definition 8.2 (Filter-descriptive possibility frames). (cf. [29, Definition 5.39]) A possibility frame
F = (W,⊑, R,P) is said to be filter-descriptive, if the following conditions hold:
• it is tight;
• for every proper filter10 F in BP, there exists an element w ∈ W such that F = P (w) = {X ∈
P | w ∈ X}.
Remark 8.3. As we mentioned on page 4, for any possibility frame F = (W,⊑, R,P), RO(W, τ⊑)
might not be closed under the three conditions in Definition 2.2. However, if F is a filter-descriptive
possibility frame, RO(W, τ⊑) is always closed under the three conditions, i.e. given any filter-descriptive
possibility frame FFD = (W,⊑, R,P), its underlying full possibility frame FRO = (W,⊑, R,RO(W, τ⊑))
is well-defined (see [29, Theorem 5.32.1, Proposition 5.40]).
In this section, we will mainly work on the dual algebraic side, i.e. the dual BAOs of filter-descriptive
possibility frames and the dual BAOs of their underlying full possibility frames. Indeed, the latter are
the constructive canonical extension of the former, which we will discuss below.
8.1.2 Canonical extension
As is known in the setting of Kripke semantics and its algebraic counterpart, given a descriptive general
frame G and its underlying Kripke frame F, the dual BAO of F is the canonical extension of the dual
BAO of G. It is natural to ask what is the relation between the dual BAO of a filter-descriptive
possibility frame FFD and the dual BAO of its underlying full possibility frame FRO. Indeed, by [29,
Theorem 5.46], given any filter-descriptive possibility frame FFD = (W,⊑, R,P) and its underlying
full possibility frame FRO = (W,⊑, R,RO(W, τ⊑)), the dual BAO of FRO is the constructive canonical
extension of FFD. In what follows, we will collect the basic definitions about canonical extensions. We
will refer the reader to [3, Chapter 6] for more details.
Definition 8.4 (Canonical extensions of Boolean algebras). (cf. [3, Chapter 6, Definition 104]) The
canonical extension of a Boolean algebra B is a complete Boolean algebra Bδ containing B as a sub-
Boolean algerba, and such that:
(denseness) every element of Bδ is both a meet of joins and a join of meets of elements from B;
(compactness) for all S, T ⊆ B with
∧
S ≤
∨
T in Bδ, there exist some finite subsets F ⊆ S and
G ⊆ T such that
∧
F ≤
∨
G.11
10A proper filter in a BAO B is a non-empty subset F ⊆ B such that
– for any a, b ∈ F , a ∧ b ∈ F ;
– for any a, b ∈ B, if a ≤ b and a ∈ B, then b ∈ B;
– ⊥ /∈ F .
11In fact, this is an equivalent formulation of the definition in [3].
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An element x ∈ Bδ is closed (resp. open)12, if it is the meet (resp. join) of some subset of B. We
let K(Bδ) and O(Bδ) respectively denote the sets of closed and open elements of Bδ. It is easy to see
that elements in B are exactly the ones which are both closed and open (i.e. clopen).
It is well known that the canonical extension of a Boolean algebra B is unique up to an isomorphism
for any given B, and that assuming the axiom of choice, the canonical extension of a Boolean algebra
is a perfect Boolean algebra, i.e. a complete and atomic Boolean algebra (cf. e.g. [29, page 90-91]).
The following properties can be easily checked:
Lemma 8.5. 1. (B∂)δ ∼= (Bδ)∂ ;
2. (Bn)δ ∼= (Bδ)n;
3. (Bε)δ ∼= (Bδ)ε;
4. K((B∂)δ) = O((Bδ)∂);
5. O((B∂)δ) = K((Bδ)∂);
6. K((Bn)δ) = (K(Bδ))n;
7. O((Bn)δ) = (O(Bδ))n.
Let A,B be Boolean algebras. An order-preserving map f : A → B can be extended to a map
Aδ → Bδ in two canonical ways. Let fσ and fπ respectively denote the σ and π-extension of f ([3,
page 375]) defined as follows:
Definition 8.6 (σ- and π-extension). For any order-preserving map f : A → B and all u ∈ Aδ, we
define
fσ(u) =
∨
{
∧
{f(a) : x ≤ a ∈ A} : u ≥ x ∈ K(Aδ)}
fπ(u) =
∧
{
∨
{f(a) : y ≥ a ∈ A} : u ≤ y ∈ O(Aδ)}.
For any map f : A → B we let f∂ : A∂ → B∂ be such that f∂(a) := f(a) for all a ∈ A, we have
that (f∂)σ = (fπ)∂ and (f∂)π = (fσ)∂ .
Since in a BAO, ✷ is meet-preserving, it is smooth, i.e. ✷σ = ✷π (cf. [3, Proposition 111(3)]).
Therefore, the canonical extension of a BAO can be defined as follows:
Definition 8.7 (Canonical extensions of BAOs). The canonical extension of any BAO (B,✷) is
(Bδ,✷σ) = (Bδ,✷π).
Definition 8.8 (Perfect Boolean algebra). (cf. [3, Chapter 6, Definition 40]) A BAO B = (B,⊥,⊤,∧,∨,−,✷)
is said to be perfect, if B is complete, atomic and completely multiplicative.
As is argued in [29, page 90-91], with the axiom of choice, it can be shown that if B is a BAO,
then Bδ is a perfect BAO. When the axiom of choice is not available, the canonical extension of a
BAO cannot be shown to be prefect in general. What can be shown is that the canonical extension of
a BAO is the constructive canonical extension defined in e.g. [22], which is complete and completely
multiplicative.
As is shown in [29, Theorem 5.46], BRO is in fact the constructive canonical extension of BFD.
Therefore, the following diagram shows the relation between filter-descriptive possibility frames and
their underlying full possibility frames, as well as their duals:
12Notice that here the definition of closedness and openness is different from the ones in the order topology introduced
by the refinement order. In the remainder of the present section, closedness and openness refer to this definition.
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BFD
BRO
FFD
FRO
(·)δ U
∼=∂
∼=∂
Here ∼=∂ means dual equivalence, U is the forgetful functor dropping the admissible condition
and replace the admissible set to the set of regular opens in the downset topology, (·)δ is taking the
constructive canonical extension.
Using the definitions and constructions given above, it is possible to define the notion of filter-
canonicity:
Definition 8.9 (Filter-canonicity). We say that an inequality ϕ ≤ ψ is filter-canonical, if whenever it
is valid on a filter-descriptive possibility frame, it is also valid on its underlying full possibility frame.13
By the duality theory of possibility semantics (see [29, Section 5]), filter-canonicity above is equiv-
alent to the preservation under taking constructive canonical extension.
Now we can come back to the U-shaped argument given on page 21. This argument starts from
the top-left corner with the validity of the input inequality ϕ ≤ ψ on FFD, then reformulate it as the
validity of the inequality in BRO with propositional variables interpreted as elements in BFD, and use
the algorithm ALBA to transform the inequality into an equivalent quasi-inequality Pure(ϕ ≤ ψ) as
well as its first-order translation, and then go back to the dual filter-descriptive possibility frame. Since
the validity of the first-order formula does not depend on the admissible set, the bottom equivalence
is obvious. The right half of the argument goes on the side of full possibility frames and their duals,
the soundness of which is already shown in Section 6.
Indeed, the U-shaped argument on page 21 gives the following results:
• Correspondence results with respect to filter-descriptive frames, which only uses the left arm of
the U-shaped argument;
• Canonicity results, which uses the whole U-shaped argument14;
Since the equivalences of the right arm of the U-shaped argument is already shown in Section
6, and the bottom equivalence is obvious, we will focus on the equivalences of the left-arm, i.e. the
soundness of the algorithm with respect to filter-descriptive possibility frames and their duals.
8.2 Soundness over filter-descriptive possibility frames
In the present section we will prove the soundness of the algorithm ALBA with respect to the dual
BAOs of filter-descriptive possibility frames. Indeed, similar to other semantic settings (see e.g. [10]),
the soundness proof of the filter-descriptive possibility frame side goes similar to that of the full
possibility frame side (i.e. Theorem 6.1), and for every rule except for the Ackermann rules, the proof
goes without modification, thus we will only focus on the Ackermann rules here, which is justified by
the topological Ackermann lemmas given below.
13Notice that here our definition is different from [29, Definition 7.15], which is based on the notion of canonical
possibility models and frames.
14In fact, as is mentioned in [29, Section 7], using techniques from [11], the canonicity results can also be obtained
via another U-shaped argument where nominals are interpreted as closed elements. Therefore, our proof here can be
regarded as an alternative proof which has its relational counterpart.
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8.2.1 Topological Ackermann lemmas
In the present section we prove the topological Ackermann lemmas, which is the technical core of the
soundness proof of the Ackermann rules with respect to filter-descriptive possibility frames. The proof
is analogous to the topological Ackermann lemmas in the existing literature (e.g. [35]), and we only
expand on the proofs which are different.
For the Ackermann rules, the soundness proof with respect to full possibility frames is justified by
the following Ackermann lemmas:
Lemma 8.10 (Right-handed Ackermann lemma). Let α be such that p /∈ Prop(α), let β1(p), . . . , βn(p)
be positive in p, let γ1(p), . . . , γn(p) be negative in p, and let ~q,~j be all the propositional variables,
nominals, respectively, occurring in α, β1(p), . . . , βn(p), γ1(p), . . . , γn(p) other than p. Then for all
~a ∈ BRO, ~x ∈ PsAt(BRO), the following are equivalent:
1. βBROi (~a, ~x, α
BRO(~a, ~x)) ≤ γBROi (~a, ~x, α
BRO(~a, ~x)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
2. There exists a0 ∈ BRO such that αBRO(~a, ~x) ≤ a0 and β
BRO
i (~a, ~x, a0) ≤ γ
BRO
i (~a, ~x, a0) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Lemma 8.11 (Left-handed Ackermann lemma). Let α be such that p /∈ Prop(α), let β1(p), . . . , βn(p)
be negative in p, let γ1(p), . . . , γn(p) be positive in p, and let ~q,~j be all the propositional variables,
nominals, respectively, occurring in α, β1(p), . . . , βn(p), γ1(p), . . . , γn(p) other than p. Then for all
~a ∈ BRO, ~x ∈ PsAt(BRO), the following are equivalent:
1. βBROi (~a, ~x, α
BRO(~a, ~x)) ≤ γBROi (~a, ~x, α
BRO(~a, ~x)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
2. There exists a0 ∈ BRO such that a0 ≤ αBRO(~a, ~x) and β
BRO
i (~a, ~x, a0) ≤ γ
BRO
i (~a, ~x, a0) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
As is similar to what is discussed in the existing literature (e.g. [10, Section 9]), the soundness
proof of the Ackermann rules, namely the Ackermann lemmas, cannot be straightforwardly adapted
to the setting of admissible assignments, since formulas in the expanded modal language L+ might
be interpreted as elements in BRO \ BFD even if all the propositional variables are interpreted in BFD,
thus we cannot find the a0 ∈ BFD required in the setting of admissible assignments. Therefore, some
adaptations are necessary based on the syntactic shape of the formulas, the definitions of which are
analogous to [35, Definition B.3]:
Definition 8.12 (Syntactically closed and open formulas). 1. A formula in L+ is syntactically closed
if all occurrences of nominals and ♦ are positive, and all occurrences of  are negative;
2. A formula in L+ is syntactically open if all occurrences of nominals and ♦ are negative, and all
occurrences of  are positive.
As is discussed in [10, Section 9], the intuition behind these definitions is that the value of a
syntactically open (resp. closed) formula under an admissible assignment is always an open (resp.
closed) element in BRO, i.e., in O(BRO) (resp. K(BRO)), therefore we can apply compactness to obtain
an admissible a0 as required by the Ackermann lemmas stated below, which are analogous to [35,
Lemma B.4, B.5]:
Lemma 8.13 (Right-handed topological Ackermann lemma). Let α be syntactically closed, p /∈
Prop(α), let β1(p), . . . , βn(p) be syntactically closed and positive in p, let γ1(p), . . . , γn(p) be syntac-
tically open and negative in p, and let ~q,~j be all the propositional variables, nominals, respectively,
occurring in α, β1(p), . . . , βn(p), γ1(p), . . . , γn(p) other than p. Then for all ~a ∈ BFD, ~x ∈ PsAt(BRO),
the following are equivalent:
1. βBROi (~a, ~x, α
BRO(~a, ~x)) ≤ γBROi (~a, ~x, α
BRO(~a, ~x)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
2. There exists a0 ∈ BFD such that αBRO(~a, ~x) ≤ a0 and β
BRO
i (~a, ~x, a0) ≤ γ
BRO
i (~a, ~x, a0) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Lemma 8.14 (Left-handed topological Ackermann lemma). Let α be syntactically open, p /∈ Prop(α),
let β1(p), . . . , βn(p) be syntactically closed and negative in p, let γ1(p), . . . , γn(p) be syntactically open
and positive in p, and let ~q,~j be all the propositional variables, nominals, respectively, occurring in
α, β1(p), . . . , βn(p), γ1(p), . . . , γn(p) other than p. Then for all ~a ∈ BFD, ~x ∈ PsAt(BRO), the following
are equivalent:
1. βBROi (~a, ~x, α
BRO(~a, ~x)) ≤ γBROi (~a, ~x, α
BRO(~a, ~x)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
2. There exists a0 ∈ BFD such that a0 ≤ αBRO(~a, ~x) and β
BRO
i (~a, ~x, a0) ≤ γ
BRO
i (~a, ~x, a0) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In order to prove the topological Ackermann lemmas stated above, we need to prove some properties
of the connectives and formulas, which are analogous to their counterparts in [35, Section B]. The proofs
of the items are also similar, so we only provide the proofs for the items which have different proofs.
Indeed, the next lemma is the only one which needs a different proof, since elements in PsAt(BRO)
are not necessarily complete join-irreducible elements.
Lemma 8.15. PsAt(BRO) ⊆ K(BRO).
Proof. It suffices to show that for any element w ∈ W , ro({w}) =
∧
{a ∈ BFD | w ∈ a}. It is easy
to see that ro({w}) ≤
∧
{a ∈ BFD | w ∈ a}. Suppose that the inequality is strict, then there exists a
v ∈ W such that v /∈ ro({w}) and v ∈
∧
{a ∈ BFD | w ∈ a}. By Definition 8.2, every filter-descriptive
possibility frame is ⊑-tight, therefore v ⊑ w. Since ro({w}) is downward closed, we have v ∈ ro({w}),
a contradiction.
Lemma 8.16. For all c ∈ K(BRO) and o ∈ O(BRO),
1. ✷RO(c),✸RO(c),♦RO(c) ∈ K(BRO);
2. ✷RO(o),✸RO(o), RO(o) ∈ O(BRO).
Lemma 8.17. Let C = {ci : i ∈ I} ⊆ K(BRO) be non-empty and downward-directed, O = {oi : i ∈
I} ⊆ O(BRO) be non-empty and upward-directed, then
1. ✷RO(
∨
O) =
∨
{✷RO(o) : o ∈ O};
2. ✸RO(
∧
C) =
∧
{✸RO(c) : c ∈ C};
3.  RO(
∨
O) =
∨
{ RO(o) : o ∈ O};
4. ♦RO(
∧
C) =
∧
{♦RO(c) : c ∈ C}.
Lemma 8.18. Let ϕ(p) be syntactically closed and ψ(p) syntactically open, and let ~p,~j be all the
propositional variables, nominals, respectively, occuring in ϕ(p) and ψ(p) other than p, ~a ∈ BFD, ~x ∈
PsAt(BRO), c ∈ K(BRO), o ∈ O(BRO), then
1. If ϕ(p) is positive in p, then ϕBRO(~a, ~x, c) ∈ K(BRO);
2. If ψ(p) is negative in p, then ψBRO(~a, ~x, c) ∈ O(BRO);
3. If ϕ(p) is negative in p, then ϕBRO(~a, ~x, o) ∈ K(BRO);
4. If ψ(p) is positive in p, then ψBRO(~a, ~x, o) ∈ O(BRO).
Lemma 8.19. Let ϕ(p) be syntactically closed, ψ(p) be syntactically open, and let ~p,~j be all the
proposition variables, nominals, respectively, occuring in ϕ(p) and ψ(p) other than p, ~a ∈ BFD, ~x ∈
PsAt(BRO), {ci : i ∈ I} ⊆ K(BRO) be non-empty and downward-directed, {oi : i ∈ I} ⊆ O(BRO) be
non-empty and upward-directed, then
1. If ϕ(p) is positive in p, then ϕBRO(~a, ~x,
∧
{ci : i ∈ I}) =
∧
{ϕBRO(~a, ~x, ci) : i ∈ I};
2. If ψ(p) is negative in p, then ψBRO(~a, ~x,
∧
{ci : i ∈ I}) =
∨
{ψBRO(~a, ~x, ci) : i ∈ I};
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3. If ϕ(p) is negative in p, then ϕBRO(~a, ~x,
∨
{oi : i ∈ I}) =
∧
{ϕBRO(~a, ~x, oi) : i ∈ I};
4. If ψ(p) is positive in p, then ψBRO(~a, ~x,
∨
{oi : i ∈ I}) =
∨
{ψBRO(~a, ~x, oi) : i ∈ I}.
Corollary 8.20. Let ϕ be syntactically closed and ψ syntactically open, and let ~p,~j be all the proposition
variables, nominals, respectively, occurring in ϕ and ψ, ~a ∈ BFD, ~x ∈ PsAt(BRO). Then
1. ϕA
δ
(~a, ~x, ~y) ∈ K(BRO);
2. ψA
δ
(~a, ~x, ~y) ∈ O(BRO).
8.3 Results
Using the soundness of the algorithm ALBA with respect to filter-descriptive possibility frames, we
have the following results:
Theorem 8.21. For any inequality ϕ ≤ ψ in the basic modal language L on which ALBA succeeds
and outputs FO(ϕ ≤ ψ), ϕ ≤ ψ corresponds to FO(ϕ ≤ ψ) in the sense that for any filter-descriptive
possibility frame F, F  ϕ ≤ ψ if and only if F  FO(ϕ ≤ ψ).
Proof. By the left-arm of the U-shaped argument given on page 21.
Theorem 8.22. Any inequality ϕ ≤ ψ in the basic modal language L on which ALBA succeeds is
preserved under taking constructive canonical extension, and hence filter-canonical.
Proof. By the whole U-shaped argument given on page 21.
9 Conclusions and future directions
In the present section, we will discuss some aspects of correspondence and canonicity in possibility
semantics, and give some future directions.
9.1 The variation of interpretations: nominals and approximation rules in
different ALBAs
The SQEMA15-ALBA line of algorithmic correspondence research starts from Boolean algebra based
modal logics [9], and later on the underlying semantic environment generalizes to distributive lattices
[10], general lattices [12], constructive extensions of lattices [11] and possibility semantics. Along
the line of generalizations, properties specific to certain settings are separated from the more general
properties. Here we are going to discuss the rules of nominals, i.e. the approximation rules in detail.
Boolean algebras with operators. In the setting of Boolean algebras with operators, every CAV-
BAO has atoms, which are complete join-irreducibles, complete join-primes and join-generators. There-
fore, the following kind of approximation rule is available (see [9]):
i ≤ ✸γ
(Left-✸-Appr)
i ≤ ✸j j ≤ γ
where the nominals are interpreted as atoms. To guarantee the soundness of the rule above, the
following properties are used (in the remainder of this subsection, we will abuse notation and identify
formulas with their interpretations on algebras):
• First of all, ✸γ is represented as ✸
∨
{j ∈ At(B) | j ≤ γ}, which uses the fact that the atoms in
the CAV-BAOs are join-generators;
15SQEMA stands for Second-order Quantifier Elimination for Modal formulae using Ackermann’s lemma (see [9]).
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• secondly, since ✸ is completely join-preserving, it can be equivalently represented as
∨
{✸j | j ∈
At(B) and j ≤ γ};
• finally, i ≤
∨
{✸j | j ∈ At(B) and j ≤ γ} iff there exists a j ∈ At(B) such that j ≤ γ and i ≤ ✸j,
which uses the fact that the atoms are completely join-prime.
Therefore, the semantic properties used in the soundness proof of (Left-✸-Appr) are the following:
• Atoms are join-generators;
• ✸ is completely join-preserving;
• Atoms are completely join-prime.
Therefore, the atomicity of CAV-BAOs are not essentially used in the soundness proof of the rule
above.
Distributive lattice expansions. Going from Boolean algebras with operators to distributive lat-
tice expansions, the atomicity is not available anymore. However, in perfect distributive lattices, there
are complete join-irreducibles which are also complete join-primes and join-generators, although not
necessarily atomic. Therefore, as we analyzed in the Boolean setting, if we interpret the nominals
as complete join-irreducibles (i.e. complete join-primes), these properties are enough to guarantee the
rule (Left-✸-Appr) to be sound on perfect distributive lattice expansions.
General lattice expansions. In the further general setting of perfect general lattice expansions
without assuming distributivity, complete join-irreducibles are not the same as complete join-primes
anymore. The remaining property in general lattice expansions is that the complete join-irreducibles
(here we denote the set of complete join-irreducibles of the lattice L as J(L)) are still join-generators.
Consider the following rule:
(S, ϕ(γ/!x) ≤ ψ)
(L+A)
(S∪{i ≤ γ}, ϕ(i/!x) ≤ ψ)
with +x ≺ +ϕ(!x), the branch of +ϕ(!x) starting at +x being SLR, γ belonging to the original modal
language and i being the first nominal variable not occurring in S or ϕ(γ/!x) ≤ ψ.
To guarantee the soundness of the rule above, the following properties are used:
• First of all, ϕ(γ) is represented as ϕ(
∨
{j ∈ J(L) | j ≤ γ}), which uses the fact that the complete
join-irreducibles in prefect general lattices are join-generators;
• secondly, since ϕ(!x) is completely join-preserving, it can be equivalently represented as
∨
{ϕ(j) |
j ∈ J(L) and j ≤ γ};
• finally,
∨
{ϕ(j) | j ∈ J(L) and j ≤ γ} ≤ ψ iff for all j ∈ J(L) s.t. j ≤ γ, it holds that ϕ(j) ≤ ψ,
which does not use special properties of perfect general lattice expansions.
Therefore, in an approximation rule like (L+A), the semantic property essentially used is that the
complete join-irreducibles are join-generators. As a result, any complete lattice-like structures which
have join-generators can have an approximation rule in the style of (L+A) to be sound, once the
nominals are interpreted as the join-generators.
For example, in the constructive canonical extensions of general lattice expansions, they are not
necessarily perfect, so there are not “enough” complete join-irreducibles. However, in a canonical
extension, every element can be represented as the join of closed elements, therefore if we interpret the
nominals as closed elements, the approximation rule above is sound.
In possibility semantics, the regular open dual BAOs of full possibility frames are CV-BAOs, thus
do not have “enough” atoms. However, in this setting, the regular open closures of singletons can
serve as the join-generators, which gives the semantic environment for the rule (L+A) to be sound.
To sum up, the following table shows the semantic properties available in each setting, which
justifies the use of different approximation rules in each setting:
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Propositional base Nominals/join-generators Complete join-primes
Boolean algebras atoms atoms
distributive lattices complete join-irreducibles complete join-irreducibles
general lattices complete join-irreducibles not enough
constructive canonical extensions closed elements not enough
possibility semantics regular open closures of singletons not enough
9.2 The essence of minimal valuation
As we can see from the previous subsection, nominals are not necessarily interpreted as atoms (single-
tons) or complete join-irreducibles, anything that can be taken as the join-generators can serve as the
interpretation. Therefore, the execution of the algorithm ALBA provides quasi-inequalities equivalent
to the input formula (inequality), which are in the language with nominals and the connectives in the
expanded modal language. Therefore, a successful ALBA reduction of a modal formula to the pure
language means that the input modal formula can be expressed by the join-generators. In the setting
of constructive canonical extensions of general lattices, there is not (yet) an obvious way of expressing
closed elements in the first-order correspondence language. However, in other settings, we can express
the atoms, complete join-irreducibles or regular open closures of singletons in the first-order corre-
spondence language. Since we also have the first-order translation of the connectives both in the basic
modal language and in the expanded modal language, we can thus translate the pure quasi-inequalities
into first-order formulas.
9.3 Translation method and its limitations
Since possibility frames have two binary relations, it is natural to view them as bimodal Kripke
frames with additional restrictions on the valuations of propositional variables (see [44] for a detailed
discussion of this bimodal perspective). Therefore, a natural question is whether we can use this
view to reduce correspondence problems in possibility semantics to correspondence problems in the
bimodal language, like using the Go¨del translation from intuitionistic logic to S4 modal logic (see [15]
for a detailed discussion of the power and limits of translation method in correspondence theory). As
we can see in e.g. [44], when we try to reduce correspondence problems in possibility semantics to
correspondence problems in the bimodal language, a problem arises due to the complication of the
formula structure of the bimodal formulas after the translation. However, since there are additional
properties satisfied in the bimodal language (e.g. the interaction axioms between the accessibility
relation and the refinement relation), there are additional order-theoretic properties satisfied, which
can make more connective combinations having the nice order-theoretic properties. One example is
✷⊑✸⊑, which is meet-preserving. If we make the analysis from the prespective of the order-theoretic
properties of the individual connectives only, then ✷⊑✸⊑ is of the shape of the antecedent of the
McKinsey formula, which has a very bad combination pattern.
Therefore, a natural question is: can we use the order-theoretic properties of the combinations of
connectives in correspondence theory for superintuitionistic logics, in addition to the properties of the
individual connectives, to obtain results like in [37]?
9.4 Constructive canonical extensions
As we can see in [29, Theorem 5.46] and the canonicity proof in the present paper, the persistence notion
corresponding to the validity preservation from filter-descriptive possibility frames to their underlying
full possibility frames is exactly the same as the validity preservation under taking constructive canon-
ical extension. Therefore, possibility semantics provides a relational semantic environment to give
canonicity proofs without appealing to the axiom of choice and its equivalent forms. In addition, pos-
sibility frames could be recognized as the dual relational semantic environment to study constructive
canonical extensions [22, 23]. In this sense, we can say that possibility semantics is the constructive
counterpart of Kripke semantics.
A future question related to the constructive feature is about the frame-theoretic counterpart
of constructive canonical extensions in lattice-based settings, i.e. non-classical versions of possibility
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semantics as the duals of distributive lattices and their canonical extensions, which is expected to
“relationalize” the constructive canonical extensions in a “pointed” way, where “points” refer to filters
rather than prime filters or ultrafilters. For the intuitionistic generalization of possibility semantics, it
is already studied in [1] as Dragalin semantics.
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